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ABSTRACT 
In the case of Hill v Church of Scientology the Supreme Court of Canada declined to 
modify the common law of defamation in light of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. This paper considers the implications of this decision by examining the 
relationship of a freedom of expression provision in a constitution and the laws of 
defamation. Although the laws of defamation directly restrict freedom of expression, it is 
possible for courts to retain traditional defamation laws even with a constitutional 
protection of freedom of expression. 
This paper demonstrates the difficulty in providing for a relaxation of defamation laws in 
the constitution. However, despite the Supreme Court's decision not to modify 
defamation laws in light of the Charter, cases in provincial courts show that a change in 
these laws may come about through an expansion of qualified privilege without using the 
constitution as a vehicle. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper ( excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 13 ,100 words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Over the past ten years there has been a relaxation in the common law of 
defamation in several commonwealth countries, namely England, Australia, and New 
Zealand. 1 Canada, however, has retained traditional defamation laws that give strong 
protection to reputation at the expense of freedom of expression. This is remarkable, for 
the reason that out of the above countries it is the only one with an entrenched protection 
of freedom of expression. 
This essay considers the relationship of a freedom of expression provision in a 
constitution and the laws of defamation. The Canadian experience shows that a freedom 
of expression provision in a constitution does not guarantee a relaxation in the common 
law of defamation. A look at the decisions of courts in other jurisdictions shows that the 
converse is also true. An entrenched constitution is not necessary to change the common 
law of defamation. 
The Canadian Charter did not compel the Court to change defamation laws in the 
case of Hill v Church of Scientology. 2 Part V considers whether it is possible to draft a 
constitution that would compel this change. It concludes that although there are various 
ways to make change more likely to occur, it is very difficult to guarantee a change. 
Constitutions are open to judicial interpretation, and therefore the decision as to whether 
to modify defamation laws is in the hands of the judiciary. Nonetheless, this does not 
mean that a freedom of expression provision is irrelevant to defamation laws. It provides 
an avenue for the Court to make dramatic changes to the common law of defamation, and 
allows it to strike down defamation legislation inconsistent with freedom of expression. 
Although the Supreme Court did not change defamation laws in Hill v Church of 
Scientology, there is evidence that it would do so given a different fact situation. Some 
1 England : Reynolds v Time Newspapers [1999] 4 All ER 609 (HL); Australia : Lange v Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation ( 1996) 145 ALR 96 (HC); New Zealand: Lange v Atkinson [ 1998] 3 NZLR 424 
(CA) and [2000] 1 NZLR 385 (CA). 
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provincial courts have extended the defence of qualified privilege to the media in certain 
matters. However, this extension has been done through an expansion of the common 
law, rather than through a Charter challenge. This reinforces that a constitution is not a 
necessary vehicle to effect change. 
II THE COMMON LAW OF DEFAMATION 
A The History of Defamation 
Defamation laws were developed in the Middle Ages in England to protect 
leaders and rulers. 3 In 1275 De Scandalum Magnutum (the scandal of magnates) was 
enacted, which prohibited criticism of public figures. This was extended by the Statute 
of Gloucester,4 which provided for the imprisonment of "every devisor of false news, of 
horrible and false lies, of prelates, dukes, earls, barons and other nobles and great men of 
the realm". Ordinary citizens were left to resolve disputes with duelling. As the 
incidences of duelling increased, restrictive defamation laws were enacted to keep the 
f 
. 5 peace o society. 
The history of defamation shows that the laws did not grow out of the 
government's wish to protect the reputation of the ordinary citizen and balance this with 
the right to express oneself freely. 6 It was originally a self-protection measure by the 
legislature, and later extended to others as a means of keeping the peace. The right to 
freedom of expression, which is so highly valued in modem society, was not given much 
consideration when the laws of defamation were developing. 
2 Hill v Church of Scientology [1995] 2 SCR 1130. 
3 P F Ca1ier Ruck and R Walker Carter-Ruck on libel and Slander (3 ed, Butterwo1ihs, London, 1985) 19. 
4 1378 (2 Ric, c 5) 
5 P F Carter Ruck and R Walker Carter-Ruck on Libel and Slander (3 ed, Butterworths, London, 1985) 20. 
6 Richard G Dearden "Constitutional Protection for Defamatory Words Published About the Conduct of 
Public Officials" in David Schneiderman ( ed) Freedom of Expression and the Charter (Thomas 
Professional Publishing, Ontario, 1991) 287,299. 
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B Defamation Laws in Canada 
The aim of this section is to show that the restrictive nature of the common law of 
defamation does not adequately provided for freedom of expression in a modem society. 
1 Policy values behind defamation 
The purpose of defamation laws is to protect individuals from false and injurious 
attacks on their reputations. This protection is seen as important, as everyone has an 
interest in safeguarding or vindicating his or her reputation.7 
Although most defamation cases refer to the value attached to reputation, there is 
little written on exactly what reputation is, and why it warrants protection.8 An answer to 
the first question is that reputation is the perception others hold of a person. This can be 
compared to a person's character, which refers to the actual attributes or personality of a 
person, rather than the esteem the individual is held in by others. 9 
There are two main reasons as to why reputation warrants protection. The first is 
that reputation is an essential component of human dignity and is closely related to the 
'innate worthiness of an individual'. 10 The second is that an attack on reputation may 
cause serious damage to a person's life. The damage may be either economic or social. 
It is considered just for the law to provide redress for damage caused by another person. 
In a defamation context, this is usually done by the award of monetary compensation. 
When examining the common law of defamation it is necessary to keep in mind 
that the purpose of these laws to protect reputation. It is also necessary to consider 
whether the law achieves this purpose. 
7 Eric Barendt "What is the Point of Libel Laws?" ( 1999) 52 CLP 110, 112. 
8 Barendt, above, I 14. 
9 Plato Films Ltd v Spiedel [ I 96 I] I AC I 090, 1137-1139 (HL) Lord Denning. 
'
0 Hill v Church of Scientology [ 1995] 2 SCR 1130, para 110 Cory J for the Court. 
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2 Elements of defamation 
The law of defamation in Canada is primarily a common law subject. 11 This 
means that the law of defamation across provinces is similar, and that any decision of the 
Supreme Court on the common law of defamation will affect all common law provinces. 
Although every province has a statute concerning defamation, these statutes merely 
modify and codify certain aspects of the common law. 12 They do not change the 
fundamentals of defamation law, which can still be found in case law. Therefore, 
defamation law in Canada is similar to that of other common law countries, which is 
based on English jurisprudence. It is significant that the law of defamation is 
predominately common law, as this means the development of the law remains up to the 
judiciary. 13 It is up to the courts to control the balance between freedom of expression 
and reputation. 
Unlike most modern torts, defamation is a strict liability offence. 14 This means 
that the defendant may be found liable without fault. An action for defamation is 
established once the plaintiff shows three things: ( 1) that the statement is reasonably 
capable of being defamatory; (2) that the words refer to the plaintiff; and (3) that the 
words have been published (that is, made known to a third party). 15 
A statement is considered to be defamatory if it exposes a person to hatred, 
ridicule, or contempt, 16 causes that person to be shunned or avoided, 17 or tends to lower 
that person in the eyes of a right-thinking member of society. 18 The threshold for what is 
considered to be defamatory is set at a relatively low level. 19 It is unlikely for a plaintiff 
to fail on this element. For instance, in Berkoff v Burchill a description of the plaintiff as 
11 Lewis Klar Tort Law (Thomas Professional Publishing, Alberta, 1991) 481. 
12 Klar, above, 481. 
13 Klar, above, 483. 
14 Allen Linden Canadian Tort Law (5ed, Butterworths, Toronto, 1993) 657. 
15 Linden, above, 638-655. 
16 Parmiter v Coupland (1840) 151 ER 340, 342 (ExC) Parke B. 
17 Youssoupof! v MGM Pictures Ltd ( 1934) 50 TLR 581, 587 (CA) Slesser LJ. 
I& Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237, 1240 (HL) Lord Atkin. 
19 Lewis Klar "If You Don ' t Have Something Good to Say About Someone ... " in David Schneiderman (ed) 
Freedom of Expression and the Charter (Thomas Professional Publishing, Ontario, 1991) 261, 263. 
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'hideously ugly' was held to be defamatory.20 However, it is questionable whether this 
statement would lower the plaintiff in the eyes of a right-thinking person. To be 
defamatory, the words are supposed to harm a person's reputation, not merely hurt or 
injure that person's feelings. 21 This case comes dangerously close to doing just that. 
This is also illustrated by the case of Vander Zalm v Times Publishers, where a political 
cartoon showing a minister gleefully pulling the wings off a fly was held to be 
defamatory by the trial judge.22 The Court of Appeal did not overturn this finding. 
However, Craig JA questioned whether the estimation of the plaintiff in the eyes of a 
third party would be lowered merely because of the cartoon.23 In general, political satire 
will not genuinely harm a person's reputation. 
Proving that the words refer to the plaintiff is usually straightforward. However, 
the case of Hulton v Jones illustrates the harshness of strict liability.24 In that case, a 
columnist wrote a fictional piece about a man called Artemus Jones. A man by that same 
name claimed that this piece could be seen as referring to him, and that it was 
defamatory. The Court upheld this proposition, and the defendant was found liable.25 
Therefore, it is possible for a person to accidentally defame someone, and be held 
responsible for it. 
Once these three elements have been established, the plaintiff has a prima facie 
cause of action. It is presumed that damage to reputation has occurred, that the defendant 
acted with malice, and that the statement is false.26 
The presumption that damage to reputation occurs automatically upon defamation 
is not supported by evidence from case law. In Hill v Church of Scientology the lawyer 
20 Berkof!v Burchill [ l 996] 4 All ER I 008 (CA). 
21 Eric Barendt "What is the Point of Libel Laws?" (1999) 52 CLP 110, t 19. 
22 Vander Zahn v Times Publishers (1980) I 09 DLR (3d) 531 (BCCA). 
23 Vander Zahn v Times Publishers, above, 551 Craig JA. 
24 Hulton v Jones [ 191 OJ AC 20 (HL). 
25 Hulton v Jones, above, Lord Lorebum 23 . 
26 Allen Linden Canadian Tort law (5ed, Butterworths, Toronto, 1993) 638-655. 
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who was defamed went on to be appointed a judge in a provincial court. 27 It is therefore 
questionable whether his reputation actually suffered. 
Serious harm may result from a defamatory statement. For instance, in Norman v 
Westcomm International Sharing Corp. the plaintiff had an employment contract 
cancelled due to a defamatory statement made by his previous employer.28 However, the 
fact that damage may occur does not mean that it always will. Academic Eric Barent 
believes that the plaintiff should be required to prove that damage has occurred.29 It has 
generally been stated that it is too difficult to prove that a person's reputation has been 
lowered.30 However, it would be relatively easy for witnesses to testify whether they 
thought less of the plaintiff upon hearing the defamation. In Botiuk v Toronto Free Press 
Publications Ltd the Court stated that more than twelve years after the libels were 
published some people still believed the libels, which shows that evidence is available. 31 
Alternatively, plaintiffs could point to the loss of professional opportunities, for instance 
by showing failure to gain a contract, or failure to be elected to a desired position. 
Another peculiar feature about the presumption of damage is that it is not 
necessary for anyone who knew the plaintiff to have believed the defamatory statement. 
This was addressed in Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd, where witnesses stated that they did 
not believe the defamatory statements made about the plaintiff to be true.32 In asserting 
this was of no consequence Lord Reid said "it is true that X's reputation is not 
diminished, but the person defamed suffered annoyance or worse when he learns that a 
defamatory statement has been published against him."33 However, if a person's 
reputation has not suffered, then arguably no defamation has occurred. Certainly if the 
policy of defamation laws is to protect reputation, it is unnecessary to award 
compensation when no damage to reputation has occurred. 
27 Hill v Church of Scientology [ 1995] SCR I 130, para 180. 
28 Norman v Westcomm International Sharing Corp [ 1997] OJ No 4774 (Ont CJ) Wilson J. 
29 Eric Barendt " What is the Point of Libel Laws?" (1999) 52 CLP 110, 123 . 
30 Ley v Hamilton ( 1935) 153 LT 384, 386 (HL) Lord Atkin . 
3 1 Botiuk v Toronto Free Press Publications Ltd [ I 995] 3 SCR 3, para 72 Cory J (La Forest, L'Heureux-
DubE, Gonthier, McLauchlin and Iacobucci JJ concurring) . 
32 Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd [ I 97 I] I WLR 1239 (HL). 
33 Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd, above, 1246 Lord Reid . 
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If merely damage to reputation has been occurred, and not pecuniary loss, there 
are other remedies apart from monetary compensation could be used to rectify this. For 
instance, some scholars in the United States have called for an introduction of 
declarations of truth.34 This would make a public statement that the defamation was 
untrue, and would thereby reinstate the person's reputation to a certain extent. This 
remedy would not mean that people would be encouraged to libel at will, as they too 
would want to retain good reputations. In the case of the media, their professional 
reputation depends on tmthful and accurate reporting. 
Although it is relatively easy for a plaintiff to establish a pnma facie case, 
freedom of speech may not be unduly restricted if the defences available adequately 
protect people making defamatory statements. 35 A defamatory statement is presumed to 
be false, so it is up to the defendant to prove that it is not. Truth is a complete defence. 
In Hill v Church of Scientology, Cory J asked, "Surely it is not requiring too much of 
individuals that they ascertain the truth of the allegations they publish. "36 However, there 
is evidence to suggest that it may in fact be asking too much. It is not sufficient that a 
person believes the statement to be true. The person must prove that it actually is true. 
This can be difficult for the defendant to prove, as a high standard of proof is required, 
and evidence about the matter often lies with the plaintiff. 
The United States Supreme Court recognised the difficulty of proving truth in 
New York Times v Sullivan.37 As stated by Brennan J stated, "Even courts accepting this 
defence as an adequate safeguard have recognised the difficulties of adducing legal 
proofs that the alleged libel was true in all its factual particulars."38 
34 David A Barrett "Declaratory Judgment for Libel : A Better Alternati ve" (1986) 74 Cal LR 847; Marc A 
Franklin "A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current Libel Law" (1986) 74 Cal LR 809. 
35 Lewis Klar " If You Don 't Have Something Good to Say About Someone . .. " in David Schneiderman (ed) 
Freedom of Expression and the Charter (Thomas Professional Publishing, Ontario, 199 l) 26 l , 265. 
36 Hill v Church of Scientology [ 1995] 2 SCR 1130, para 140. 
37 New York Times v Sullivan (1964) 376 US 254 . 
38 New York Times v Sullivan , above, 279, Brennan J. 
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The difficulty of proving truth can be illustrated by the recent case involving 
Jeffrey Archer. Archer brought an action against the Daily Star for an article reporting 
that he was having an extra-marital affair. The paper raised the defence of truth, but did 
not succeed. (Although this was partially due to perjured evidence). It was ordered to 
pay damages of £500 000.39 However, after the trial it was revealed that the allegations 
were in fact true. Archer returned the money to the paper, including legal costs.40 Many 
defendants would not be in such a fortunate position. 
The defence of fair comment offers reasonable protection to persons making 
statements of opinion. However, it can be difficult to distinguish between statements of 
opinion (which are protected), and statements of fact (which are not). For instance, the 
statement, "I think Politician Smith is a liar," would probably be considered a statement 
of fact. This is because the comment must be based on facts truly stated, unless it is 
reasonable to assume that the receivers of the statement will be aware of those facts. 41 In 
this example there are no facts provided on which this comment is based. The words 'I 
think' will not necessarily tum a statement of fact into a statement of opinion.42 
The defence of qualified privilege allows for certain untruthful defamatory 
statements to be made. The law has held that in some circumstance it is in the best 
interests of society for communication to occur even when the statement may not be true, 
and may be defamatory.43 The statement must be made on a 'qualifying occasion' which 
exists when a person has a duty to communicate certain information, and the recipient has 
a corresponding interest in receiving the information.44 A classic example of this is when 
39 Andrew Rawnsley "Archer Wins Record £500 OOO" (25 July 1987) Guardian Unlimited 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/archer/article/0,2763,522734,00.html> last accessed 20 September 2003 . 
40 Vikram Dodd "Archer to Repay £3 m to Newspapers" (5 August 2002) Guardian Unlimited 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/archer/article/0,2763,769323,00.html> last accessed 20 September 2003. 
41 The Laws of New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington , 1994) vol I 0, Defamation, para 135. 
42 The Laws of New Zealand, above, para 134; London Artists Ltd v Littler [ 1969] 2 QB 3 75, 392 (CA) 
Lord Denning MR. 
43 Lewis Klar Tort law (Thomas Professional Publishing, Albe,ia, 1991) 498. See Toogood v Spyring 
[1824-34] All ER 735, 738 Parke B. The "common convenience and welfare of society" may require such 
communication. 
44 Adam v Ward [ 1917] AC 309, 334 (HL) Lord Atkinson. 
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45 employers provide references about former employees to prospective employers. 
Qualified privilege can be exceeded if the statement is published too widely, for instance 
if it is made to a party that has no interest in the matter.46 The privilege can also be 
defeated if the plaintiff proves that the defendant was motivated by malice, as malice is 
not presumed when using this defence. 
Traditionally this defence was not available to the media, as wide publication 
would exceed the privilege.47 The rationale behind this was that the communication 
would be likely to reach some people who had no interest in receiving it.48 In Arnold v 
King-Emperor the Court stated that no privilege attaches to the position of a journalist, 
and therefore journalists have no greater freedom to publish defamatory matter than 
ordinary citizens have.49 However, the boundaries of this defence may be expanding, as 
discussed in Part VI. 
The defence of absolute privilege allows untrue statements to be made about 
someone in situations where absolute freedom of speech has been deemed necessary, for 
instance in Parliamentary and judicial proceedings. 50 
These laws give strong protection to reputation at the expense of freedom of 
expression. This may have been an appropriate balance before the introduction of the 
Charter. However, the Charter protects and emphasises the importance of freedom of 
expression in modem society, and the laws need to be re-examined and modified in light 
of this. 
45 John ButTows and Ursula Cheer Media Law in New Zealand (4 ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland 
1999) 58-59. 
46 Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (3 ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2001) 865. 
47 Boland v Globe & Mail Ltd [ I 960] SCR 203; Banks v Globe & Mail Ltd [ 1961] SCR 494. 
48 
This is the reason qualified privilege failed in Hill. The Court found that while a qualifying occasion did 
exist, it was exceeded by holding a press conference. 
49 Arnold v King-Emperor [ 1914] AC 644 (HL) Lord Shaw. 
50 Lewis Klar Tort Law (Thomas Professional Publishing, Alberta, 1991) 494-498. 
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III THE EFFECT OF A CONSTITUTION ON DEFAMATION LAWS 
A Canada 
The common law of defamation was challenged as unconstitutional in the case of 
Hill v Church of Scientology. 51 This was the first case that challenged the 
constitutionality of the common law of defamation since the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms had been introduced in 1982. 
The facts of the case were as follows. Pursuant to a search warrant, the Ontario 
Provincial Police entered the premises of the Church of Scientology and seized thousands 
of documents. The Church brought a motion to quash the warrant, and for the documents 
to be returned. The Crown defended this action using Crown Attorney Casey Hill as 
counsel. During this action, the Court ordered for many of these documents to be sealed, 
due to solicitor-client privilege. 52 
An unrelated government official applied to review some of these sealed 
documents. The Church, without any apparent evidence, believed that Casey Hill was 
involved in this application and brought contempt of court proceedings against him. 53 
Through their lawyer Morris Manning, the Church held a press conference and read out 
the contempt motion alleging that Hill had mislead the Court and helped to open and 
inspect sealed documents.54 The contempt charge was dismissed. Hill later brought 
proceedings in defamation. He was successful, and was awarded $1.6m in damages. 55 
The Court was invited by the defence council to change the common law of 
defamation in light of the Charter. The Court declined to do so, stating that the "common 
law of defamation complies with the underlying values of the Charter, and there is no 
51 Hill v Church of Scientology [ 1995] 2 SCR 1130, Cory J for the Court. 
52 Hill v Chur9h of Scientology, above, paras 4-7. 
53 Hill v Church of Scientology, above, paras 9-15. 
54 Hill v Church of Scientology, above, paras 23-27. 
55 Hill v Church of Scientology, above, para 53. 
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need to amend or alter it."56 This is a contentious assertion, in light of the harshness of 
defamation laws, which directly restrict freedom of expression. 
B United States of America 
In 1964, the landmark case of New York Times v Sullivan constitutionalised the 
law of defamation in the United States. 57 The action arose when an elected official of the 
city of Montgomery in Alabama brought proceedings against the New York Times for an 
advertisement published that supported the civil rights movement. The jury in the Circuit 
Court of Montgomery County awarded the plaintiff damages of $500 OOO, which was 
upheld by the Supreme Court of Alabama. 58 
This was overturned on appeal to the Federal Supreme Court. The Court found 
that the common law of defamation, as applied in Alabama, failed to provide adequate 
protection for freedom of speech and of the press as required by the First Amendment.59 
The Court held that for a public official to succeed in a defamation action "actual malice" 
must be shown. This means the defendant must have knowledge that the statement was 
false, or have reckless disregard as to its falsity. 60 
This doctrine was extended in later cases to all public figures. In Gertz v Robert 
Welch Inc it was made clear that the doctrine applied to people who were involved in 
public affairs, and could include "limited purpose" public figures .61 This was defined as 
those who have "thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in 
order to influence the resolution of the issues involved". 62 Therefore, the rule attaches to 
the person, not to the issue. In Gertz the Court rejected applying the actual malice rule to 
all issues of public concern. However, this did not mean that shict liability was 
permissible. The Court held that states could allow private individuals to recover against 
56 Hill v Church of Scientology, above, para 144. 
57 New York Times v Sullivan (1964) 376 US 254 . 
58 New York Times v Sullivan, above, 256, Brennan J. 
59 New York Times v Sullivan, above, 264 Brennan J. 
60 New York Times v Sullivan, above, 279-280 Brennan J. 
6 1 Gertz v Robert Welch In c ( 1974) 418 US 323 . 
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a media defendant as long as liability without fault was not imposed.63 It is unclear the 
extent to which this applies to a non-media defendant.64 
The outcome of Sullivan and its progeny is the logical result from a country with 
a constitution that states, "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press. "65 The Court held in Sullivan that the constitution required the 
introduction of the actual malice rule. 66 Defamation laws directly restrict freedom of 
speech. Therefore, a challenge to defamation laws under the constitution meant that the 
Court believed it was necessary to change defamation laws to conform to the constitution. 
The United States approach is the intuitive response. The Constitution protects of 
freedom of speech, which is limited by the laws of defamation. Therefore, the laws of 
defamation should be changed. However, this was not the response of the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Hill to a constitutional challenge to the common law of defamation. 
Pre-Hill, Canadian academics called for a change to defamation laws in light of 
the Charter, and were hopeful that this would be addressed. 67 However, their hopes were 
dashed when the Supreme Court failed to take the opportunity to relax defamation laws. 
This attracted much academic criticism.68 Although it would appear that an entrenched 
Charter with a provision protecting freedom of speech demanded a reformulation of 
62 Gertz v Robert Welch Inc, above, 345 Powell J. 
63 Gertz v Robert Welch Inc, above, 347 Powell J. 
64 W P Keeton (ed) Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5 ed, West Publishing Co, Minnesota, 1984) 807-808. 65 US Constitution, amendment 1. 
66 New York Times v Sullivan ( 1964) 3 76 US 254, 279-280 (SC) Brennan J. 
67 Lewis Klar "If You Don't Have Something Good to Say About Someone ... " in David Schneiderman (ed) 
Freedom of Expression and the Charter (Thomas Professional Publishing, Ontario, 1991) 261 ; Richard G 
Dearden "Constitutional Protection for Defamatory Words Published About the Conduct of Public 
Officials" in Schneiderman above, 287; Rodney A Smolla "Balancing Freedom of Expression and 
Protection of Reputation Under Canada's Chat1er of Rights and Freedoms" in Schneide1man, above, 272; 
Michael Doody "Freedom of the Press, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and a New Category 
ofQualified Privilege" [1983] Can Bar Rev 124. 
68 Dennis W Boivin "Accommodating Freedom of Expression and Reputation in the Common Law of 
Defamation" (1997) 22 Queen 's LJ 229; Grant Huscroft "Defamation , Damages, and Freedom of 
Expression in Canada" [ 1996] 112 LQR 46; Charles Tingley "Reputation, Freedom of Expression and the 
Tort of Defamation in the United States and Canada: a Deceptive Polarity" ( 1999) 37 Alberta L Rev 620; 
Edward Veitch "Scandalum Magnatum is Alive and Well in Canada?" (1999-2000) 11 NJCL 169; Jeremy 
Streeter "The 'Deception Exception ' : A New Approach to Section 2 (b) Values and its impact on 
Defamation Law" (2003) 61 U Toronto Fae Law Rev 79. 
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defamation laws as the American courts felt compelled to do, the Canadian Supreme 
Court did not feel this compulsion. This leads to the conclusion that a constitutional 
guarantee of freedom of expression does not guarantee a change in defamation laws. 
While it is true that a constitution does not guarantee a change in defamation 
laws, it is also true that a constitution is not necessary for a change in defamation laws to 
occur. England, Australia, and New Zealand do not have entrenched constitutions, yet all 
of these countries have modified the common law of defamation, and taken a step in the 
direction of Sullivan. 69 
C United Kingdom 
The common law of defamation in the United Kingdom was extended in the case 
of Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd. 70 A former Prime Minister of Ireland brought an 
action in defamation against the Times alleging he was defamed by an article which 
questioned his honesty as Prime Minister. At the time of the case, England had no 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression.71 
In spite of this, the House of Lords saw fit to expand the common law of 
defamation. The Court held that qualified privilege may be able to be used when 
statements were published widely. This was not limited to statements of a political 
nature, as there could be other matters of serious public concern that would warrant 
protection. The Court would consider a number of factors to determine if statements 
made in the press would attract qualified privilege. These included factors such as the 
seriousness of the allegation, the steps taken to verify the allegations, the urgency of the 
matter, whether comment had been sought by the plaintiff, and the timing of the 
bl
. . 72 
pu 1cat10n. 
69 New York Times v Sullivan (1964) 376 US 254. 
70 Reynolds v Time Newspapers [1999) 4 All ER 609 (HL). 
71 England has since enacted the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporated the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Included in the convention is a provision protecting freedom of expression . 
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Rather than the change in law being based on a constitutional challenge to the law 
of defamation, the Court was able to expand the law by reference to the 'elasticity of the 
common law'. 73 This shows that a constitution is not a necessary vehicle for a change in 
favour of freedom of speech. 
D Australia 
Recent defamation cases in Australia are extremely interesting from a 
constitutional point of view. Australia has no freedom of expression provision in its 
constitution. However, in Australia Capital Territory v Commonwealth the High Court 
(Australia's highest appellate court) found that there was an implied right of freedom of 
communication on political matters in the constitution.74 This right was used to modify 
defamation laws in the cases of Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd75 and Lange 
v Australian Broadcasting Corporation.76 
In Theophanous, an action in defamation was taken by a member of the Federal 
Parliament in response to criticism about his fitness to hold office. 77 The Court held that 
there was a constitutional defence to publish defamatory matter in relation to political 
matters if certain requirements were met. 78 This theme was carried through to Lange v 
ABC.79 The Court rejected the approach taken by Theophanous that there was a 
constitutional defence to a defamation action.80 Instead it extended the common law of 
qualified privilege as a way of ensuring that the constitutional value of freedom of 
communication on political matters was protected. 81 
72 Reynolds v Time Newspapers, above, 626 Lord Nicholls. 
73 Reynolds v Time Newspapers, above, 625-626 Lord Nicholls. 
14 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonweath ( 1992) 177 CLR 106. 
15 Theophanous v Herald [ 1994] 124 ALR I (HC). 
16 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1996) 145 ALR 96 (HC). 
77 Theophanous v Herald, above, 8 Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ (Joint Judgment). 
78 Theophanus v Herald, above, 25 Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ (Joint Judgment). 
79 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, above. 
80 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, above, 119 Brennan CJ for the Court. 
81 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, above, 119 Brennan CJ for the Court. 
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Although different approaches were taken in these two cases, the outcome is 
essentially the same. In Australia untrue statements on political matters made to a wide 
audience may be afforded the defence of qualified privilege if the following conditions 
are met: the defendant must be unaware of the falsity of the statement; must not be 
reckless, (that is, not caring whether the statement was true or false) ; and the publication 
must be reasonable in the circumstances.82 
These two cases illustrate that a court ' s willingness to modify defamation laws is 
a key factor in this happening. Although the constitution was used to justify a change in 
defamation laws, it clearly did not compel the Court to do so. There was no express 
freedom of expression provision in the constitution that could be relied on, nor was there 
an express provision of communication in relation to political matters. The right was 
derived from sections in the constitution that set out the system of a representative and 
responsible government, the rights of citizens to exercise a free and informed choice as 
electors, and the right to cast informed votes. 83 A change to the common law of 
defamation was seen as necessary to give effect to this. Had the Court been satisfied with 
the existing law of defamation, they could merely have declined to apply this implied 
right. It was open to the Court to find that the common law was satisfactory, and that it 
accorded with the constitution, as there was no express freedom of expression provision. 
E New Zealand 
Defamation laws in New Zealand were relaxed in the case of Lange v Atkinson.84 
Former Prime Minister David Lange alleged that an article in North & South Magazine 
written by Joe Atkinson contained defamatory remarks about him. The article was 
critical of Lange 's performance as Prime Minister, commenting on a gap between 
promise and performance, his lazy attitude to work, and a selective memory (among other 
things). 85 
82 Lange v Australian Broadcasting C01poration , above, 116-11 8 Brennan CJ for the Court. 
83 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, above, I 04-108 Brennan CJ for the Court. 
84 Lange v Atkinson [I 998] 3 NZLR 424 and [2000] NZLR 385. 
85 Joe Atkinson "Getting What You Order" (October 1995) North and South Auckl and 44. 
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This case was an application by the plaintiff to strike out the defence of qualified 
privilege from the defendant's pleadings. The case went from the High Court to the 
Court of Appeal, then to the Privy Council, and finally back to the Court of Appeal, after 
which it settled. The full case was never heard. However, in the Court of Appeal it was 
decided that qualified privilege might be available when a statement has been published 
generally. 86 
This opened the doors for the media to use qualified privilege. It was held that 
given the nature of New Zealand's democracy, the public has the requisite interest in 
statements about "the actions and qualities of those currently or formerly elected to 
Parliament and those with immediate aspirations to such office, so far as those actions 
and qualities directly affect of affected their capacity (including their personal ability and 
willingness) to meet their public responsibilities". 87 
Now that New Zealand has taken a step in the direction of a Sullivan 88 approach, 
the door has been opened to an extension of the categories to which wide publication is 
allowed. In Vickery v McLean the Court of Appeal refused to extend qualified privilege 
beyond what was held in Lange v Atkinson.89 The case involved three employees of a 
district council, and was therefore held not to be political discussion.90 In any event, the 
defamation was disseminated too widely by going to the media. 91 The general public was 
held not to have an interest in the matter. 
However, it is questionable how long this distinction will survive. John Burrows 
expects the boundaries of Lange to expand in one of two ways. The privilege may extend 
to apply to include comments made on all those holding elected positions (which would 
86 Lange v Atkinson [ 1998] 3 NZLR 424, 468 (CA) Blanchard J (Richardson , Henry and Keith JJ 
concurring). 
87 Lange v Atkinson, above, 468 Blanchard J (Richardson , Henry and Keith JJ concurring). 
88 New York Times v Sullivan (1964) 376 US 254. 
89 Vickery v McLean (20 November 2000) Court of Appeal 125/00; Lange v Atkinson [2000] l NZLR 385. 
90 Vicke1y v McLean , above, para 17 Tipping J for the Cour1. 
91 Vicke,y v McLean , above, para 17 Tipping J for the Court. 
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include local body politics); and/or to those whose salaries are paid by the taxpayer.92 
The latter category would mean that Crown attorneys, like Casey Hill, would be included. 
Unlike Australia and England, New Zealand expressly protects freedom of 
expression in the Bill of Rights Act 1990.93 However, unlike Canada, it is an ordinary 
statute. Parliament can alter the Act by a simple majority vote.94 The New Zealand 
Court could have relied on this statute to alter defamation laws. In the High Court, 
Justice Elias found that the judiciary could use the Bill of Rights Act in applying the 
common law, as section 3 refers to acts of the judiciary. 95 However, the Court of Appeal 
gave little consideration to the Act. It was considered to be part of the relevant 
background against which the common law should be developed. 96 
This illustrates that an express protection of freedom of expression 1s not 
necessary to relax defamation laws. New Zealand, a country with a Bill of Rights Act 
protecting freedom of expression, chose not to use this as a vehicle to modify defamation 
laws, but instead chose to develop the common law. 
F Summary 
A look at other jurisdictions has shown that an entrenched constitution protecting 
freedom of expression is not a necessary precondition of relaxing defamation laws. 
Countries with little or no protection of freedom of expression have seen fit to relax 
defamation laws. It is understandable that countries without freedom of expression 
provisions can expand defamation laws, as the common law is constantly evolving and 
open to change. 
However, it is harder to understand Canada, which has gone in the opposite 
direction. It does have an entrenched protection of freedom of expression, yet did not 
92 John Burrows "Lange v Atkinson 2000: Analysis" (2000) NZLR 389, 39 I . 
93 Bi II of Rights Act 1990, s I 4. 
94 G Palmer and M Palmer Bridled Power (Oxford University Press, Auckland 1997) 265 . 
95 Lange v Atkinson [1997) 2 NZLR 22, 32 (HC) Elias J. 
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modify its defamation laws. Although this was an option open to the Court, it is 
remarkable in its incongruity with other commonwealth countries, and in light of the 
Charter. 
The next part of this essay considers the methods the Court employed in Hill v 
Church of Scientology to keep defamation laws at the status quo.97 
IV APPLICATION OF THE CHARTER 
A Direct Application 
One of the reasons the Court was able to find that the common law of defamation 
did not require modification under the Charter is that section 32 states that the Charter 
applies to the legislature, executive, and administrative branches of the government. This 
means that the Charter only directly applies when there is 'government action' of some 
type. The Charter applies to the common law,98 but only when the common law is the 
basis for some governmental action that is alleged to have infringed a guaranteed right or 
freedom. 99 It does not apply when there is an action between two private parties based on 
the common law. 
The defendants 100 in Hill argued that the common law of defamation should be 
subjected to Charter scrutiny. 101 They claimed that as Hill was a government employee, 
his action was 'government action' within the meaning of section 32. 102 This was 
rejected. The Supreme Court held that the defendants impugned the character of Hill 
96 GeoffMcLay "Lange v Atkinson: Not a Case for Dancing in the Streets" [2000] NZLR 427,436. 
97 
Hill v Church of Scientology [1995] 2 SCR 1130. 
98 RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery Ltd [J 986] 2 SCR 573, 592-593 McIntyre J (Dickson CJ, Estey, Chouinard 
and Le Dain JJ concuning). 
99 RWDSU v Dolphin Delive,y Ltd, above, 599 McIntyre J (Dickson CJ, Estey, Chouinard and Le Dain JJ 
concuning). 
100 As the Church was appealing an earlier decision , they should technically be called the appellants. 
However, for clarity I will refer to them as the defendants. 
10 1 Hill v Church of Scientology [1995] 2 SCR 1130, para 67 Cory J for the Court. 
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himself, and not that of the government. 103 Hill instituted legal proceedings in his own 
capacity as a private citizen, not as the result of a request by the Ministry of the Attorney-
General, or the Government of Ontario. 104 It was therefore a dispute between two private 
parties, and the Charter did not directly apply. By not applying the Charter directly, it 
made it easier for the Court to hold defamation laws at the status quo. 
The fact that the Charter did not directly apply partially explains why the law of 
defamation was not changed. However, it does not fully explain it. Had the Court 
wanted to modify defamation laws, the Court could have found that the Charter applied 
directly for two reasons. Firstly, the Ministry of the Attorney-General funded Hill's 
action. This was held not to alter his Constitutional status, "[n]or cloak his action in the 
mantle of government action". 105 However, the Court could have used this fact alone to 
conclude that it was 'government action'. If Hill was not willing or able to proceed 
without government funds, then it is difficult to conclude that this was purely a private 
action. A truly private action would be supported by private funds. 
Secondly, the Court stated that the defendants impugned the character of Hill 
himself, and not that of the government. 106 However, the defamation was directly related 
to Hill's performance of his statutory duties. It did not relate to a purely private matter. 
Defamatory remarks about the exercise of duties of a government official is so closely 
tied up in criticism of the government that in many cases it will be impossible to 
distinguish between the two. Criticism about the government will often reflect badly on 
one particular member of the government. It seems to be a slightly strange result that if 
c1iticism was made about the Prime Minister which related to the exercise of his 
functions, an action brought by him would be a private rather than government action. 
102 The common law may be subjected to Charter scrutiny when government action is based on a common 
law rule. Dolphin Delivery Ltd v RWDSU local 580 [1986] 2 SCR 573, 598 McIntyre J (Dickson CJ, 
Estey, Chouinard and Le Dain JJ concurring). 
103 Hill v Church of Scientology, above, para 77 Cory J for the Court. 
104 
Hill v Church of Scientology, above, para 77 Cory J for the Court. 
105 
Hill v Church of Scientology, [ l 995] 2 SCR l l 30 para 77 Cory J for the Court. 
106 Hill v Church of Scientology, above, para 77 Cory J for the Court. 
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The United States Supreme Court in Sullivan drew an analogy between seditious 
libel and allowing public officials to recover damages for defamation. 107 Academic 
Harry Kalven stated that the concept of seditious libel strikes at the very heart of 
democracy, and that a society which makes seditious libel an office is not a free society 
no matter what its other characteristics. 108 As Canada does allow public officials to 
recover damages, it is likely that it does not agree with this analogy to seditious libel. 
B Charter Values 
Even if the Charter is not directly applicable, the judiciary is required to apply and 
develop the common law in a way that is consistent with Charter values. 109 The 
Canadian courts have taken an interesting approach to looking at Charter values. Rather 
than focusing solely on the constitutional value of freedom of expression, the courts 
consider the values that justify the constitutional protection of freedom of expression. 110 
Various attempts were made to identify these values, but the most accepted 
pronouncement was given by the Supreme Court in Ford v Quebec.111 The values at the 
heart of freedom of expression were seen to be the quest for truth, the promotion of 
individual self-development, and participation in the community. 112 
Based on this analysis, it is easy to see how the Court found that these values 
were not advanced by defamatory statements. The Court stated: 11 3 
Defamatory statements are very tenuously related to the core values which underlies 2(b). They 
are inimical to the search for truth . False and injurious statements cannot enhance self-
development. Nor can it ever be said that they lead to a healthy participation in the affairs of the 
107 Geoffrey Palmer "Politics and Defamation - A Case of Kiwi Humbug?" [ 1972] 12 NZLJ 265, 267. 
108 Harry Kalven "The New York Times Case: A Note on the Central Meaning of the First Amendment" 
[1964] Sup Ct Rev 191 , 205 . 
109 RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery Ltd [ 1986] 2 SCR 573, 603 McIntyre J (Dickson CJ, Estey, Chouinard and 
Le Dain JJ concurring). 
11 0 Geoff McLay "Lange v Atkinson: Not a Case for Dancing in the Streets" [2000] NZLR 427, 430. 
II I 
Ford v Quebec [ 1988] 2 SCR 712. 
11 2 Ford v Quebec, above, 764-766, Judgment of the Court. 
11 3 
Hill v Church of Scientology [ 1995] 2 SCR 1130, para I 09 Cory J for the Court . 
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community. Indeed they are detrimental to the advancement of these values and harmful to the 
interests of a free and democratic society. 
However, the opposite approach could have been taken. Allowing defamatory 
statements may help in the search for truth. Mill pronounced this idea in 194 7. He 
believed that even a false statement might bring a valuable contribution to public debate, 
as it brings about "the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its 
collision with error". 114 This view was followed by the United States Supreme Court in 
New York Times v Sullivan. 115 It was also thought that the existing defamation laws 
would lead to self-censorship. People may not voice truthful allegations in case they 
would not be able to prove the truth of the statements in court. 116 Therefore, this would 
be harmful to the search for truth. 
Contrary to the view of the Supreme Court of Canada, defamatory statements may 
lead to participation in the affairs of the community. If people did not have to fear 
defamation suits, they may feel freer to voice opinions about community affairs. For 
instance, it may encourage people to write letters to the editor in local newspapers, or 
participate in debates occurring in the local council, without having to be certain they 
could prove every detail of their statements. 
Academic Jeremy Streeter believes that the problem lies not in the application of 
the values behind the Charter, but in the Court's formulation of what those values are. 11 7 
In Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec, the Comt took a wide view as to what type of speech should 
be protected by section 2 (b) of the Charter. 118 It was held that "if the activity conveys or 
attempts to convey a meaning, it has expressive content and prima facie falls within the 
scope of the guarantee". 119 This was to avoid speech being prohibited on the grounds that 
114 Mill On liberty (Blackwell, Oxford, 1947) 15. 
11 5 New York Times vSullivan (1964) 376 US 254. 
11 6 New York Times v Sullivan , above, 279 Brennan J. 
11 7 Jeremy Streeter "The 'Deception Exception ' : A New Approach to Section 2 (b) Values and its impact 
on Defamation Law" (2003) 61 U Toronto Fae Law Rev 79 
11 8 Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec [ 1989] I SCR 927. 
11 9 Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec, above, 969 Dickson CJ , Lamer and Wilson JJ (Joint Judgment). 
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it was unpopular. The Court was unwilling to exclude expression from protection based 
on its content. 
However, Streeter claims that the three values underlying section 2 (b) do not 
protect all expression, but certain types of expression. 120 This is because it is difficult to 
apply these values in a content-neutral way. For instance, the search for truth and 
participation in the community are seen as important to the functioning of democracy. 
However, a viewpoint that threatens democracy does not enhance this value. Yet by not 
giving this opinion protection, unpopular speech is being prohibited based on its 
content. 121 
Streeter believes this demonstrates that these three values are not content-neutral. He 
believes the way ensure section 2 (b) values are applied in a content-neutral way is to 
focus on the importance of the expression to the expresser, rather than the value of that 
speech to society. This is based on the idea that freedom of expression is important for 
human autonomy. The only exception to protection of speech, is that of deliberate lies. 
This goes against the purpose of freedom of expression, namely the sharing of one ' s 
thoughts. 122 Therefore, based on this value, defamation laws would have to be modified 
to allow all statements unless the expresser knew the statements to be false. 
The values used by the Court helps to explain why the law of defamation 
complied with the Charter values. However, as the Court could have applied the values 
in a different way, or reformulated the values, it does not fully explain why the Court did 
not change defamation laws. 
120 Streeter, above, 91 . 
12 1 Streeter, above, 91. 
122 Streeter, above, 90-95 . 
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V DRAFTING A CONSTITUTION 
A How Could the Canadian Charter be Drafted to Guarantee a Relaxation in 
Defamation Laws? 
Constitutions are subject to judicial interpretation, which means it is very difficult 
to guarantee a particular outcome. The Supreme Court of Canada did not feel the 
constitution required them to alter the common law of defamation. However, had they 
been unsatisfied with those laws, they could equally have found that that the Charter 
compelled them to change the laws of defamation. 
One possible way to guarantee a relaxation in defamation laws would be to draft 
the constitution in such a way that compelled the Court to apply the Charter directly. 
This could be done by either including the judiciary as a body that the Charter applies to, 
or by making the Charter available to disputes between private parties. The Government 
of New Zealand used the first mechanism. 
Section 3 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act states that the Act applies to acts 
done by the legislative, executive and judiciary. In Lange v Atkinson Elias J found that 
this section meant that the Act could be used in applying the common law. 123 The 
parallel section in the Canadian Charter is section 32, which states that the Charter 
applies to the legislature, executive, and administrative branches of the government. This 
meant that the Charter did not apply directly to the common law, but instead Charter 
values should be used to develop the common law. 
A direct application of the Charter would be likely to result in a finding that the 
common law of defamation restricts freedom of expression. Irwin Toy establishes that a 
wide view should be taken as to the type of expression that is protected by the 
constitution. 124 In R v Zundel the Court held that even deliberate lies and falsehoods are 
123 Lange v Atki.nson [1997] 2 NZLR 22, 32 (HC) Elias J. 
124 Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec [ I 989] l SCR 927. 
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protected by section 2 (b) of the Charter. 125 In R v Lucas the Court found that a statute 
imposing criminal sanctions for defamation contravened section 2 (b) of the Charter, as 
the purpose of the section was to limit a particular type of expression. 126 The purpose of 
the common law of defamation is also to restrict a certain type of expression. 
However, if the Court did find that expression was restricted, they would not be 
compelled to alter defamation laws. This is due to the availability of section 1 of the 
Charter. Section 1 states that the rights and freedoms are subject only to such reasonable 
limits presented by law that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society. Therefore, it would be open to the Court to find that the existing laws are 
justified. This was the section used by the Supreme Court in R v Lucas to hold that the 
statute was constitutionally compliant. 127 The Court found that the positive objectives of 
defamatory libel provisions and the resulting protection of reputation outweighed any 
negative effect on freedom of expression. 128 
B Would a Removal of Section 1 Guarantee a Relaxation in Defamation Laws? 
If section 1 was not included in the constitution, it is unlikely that the Court would 
have taken such a wide approach to the type of expression that is protected by section 2 
(b ). The Court took a wide approach knowing that the savings provision of section 1 
could be utilised. 
Without section 1, the Court would be able to keep defamation laws at the status 
quo in two ways. Firstly, the Court could find that defamatory statements are not 
accorded constitutional protection. This was the approach taken by the United States 
Supreme Court until the decision in Sullivan. 129 Alternatively, the Court could hold that 
the law of defamation did not restrict free speech. This was the approach taken by the 
125 R v Zundel [1992] 2 SCR 731 , 753 Mclauchlin J. 
126 R v Lucas [1998] I SCR 439, 456 Cory J (Lamer CJC, Gonthier, Iacobucci , Bastarche JJ concuning). 
127 R v Lucas, above. 
128 R v Lucas, above, 481 Cory J (Lamer CJC, Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarche JJ concun-ing). 
129 New York Tim es v Sullivan (I 964) 376 US 254; Enunciated in Herbert v Lando (1979) 441 US 153, I 85 
White J. 
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Nova Scotia Supreme Court in the case of Coates v The Citizen. 130 This case considered 
the situation where the plaintiff was a public official, and where there was a direct 
application of the Charter. Coates was the Minister of National Defence for Canada. 
While in West Germany on official business he (and a number of his aids) visited a bar 
called the Cabaret Tiffany. The Citizen reported on this, stating that the visit may have 
posed a security risk, that the bar featured porn films, nude dancers and prostitutes, and 
that the Minister spent a considerable amount of time drinking and chatting with one of 
the strippers. Due to this negative publicity, Coasts resigned from his position as 
Minister, although retained his seat in the House of Commons. 131 
This was the principal action commenced by Coates. However, this case merely 
considered the application by the defendants for an order determining a preliminary 
question of law. The defendants asserted that the Nova Scotia Defamation Act violated 
section 2 (b) of the Charter, as the Act adopted the common law presumptions of falsity, 
malice, and damage. 132 Richard J held that the Charter did apply to this action, even 
though he found it to be a dispute between two private parties. There was a provincial 
statute, so the requisite government nexus existed.133 As the Act codifies some of the 
common law rules of defamation, those too were held to be subject to Charter scrutiny, 
but only to the extent that they were included in the Act. The common law of defamation 
by itself generally could not be directly challenged. 134 Therefore two elements that were 
missing in Hill were present in this case. There was an elected official, and the Charter 
directly applied to the law of defamation. 
However, Richard J found that the Act did not restrict the right to freedom of 
expression or freedom of the press as guaranteed under the Charter. He stated that the 
Defamation Act "does not restrict the publication of news. It does not prevent comment 
13° Coates v The Citizen (1988) 44 CCL T 286 (NSSC). 
13 1 Coates v The Citizen, above, paras 4-5 Ri chard J. 
132 Defamation A et SNS 1960 c 4 
133 Coates v The Citizen, above, para 29 Ri chard J. 
134 Coates v The Citizen, above, para 29 Ri chard J . 
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on perceived government ineptitude. It does not stifle criticism of prominent political 
figures in the conduct of their duties." 135 
In essence, Richard J rejected the 'chilling effect' of defamation laws that has 
been recognised by nearly every other commonwealth court and by countless authors on 
the subject. 136 One author questions the need for absolute privilege for parliamentary 
proceedings, if defamation laws do not in fact chill political debate. 137 
However, as the case was a challenge to a statute, the Court did not consider 
whether the common law defence of qualified privilege could apply in this case (although 
Richard J expressed his doubts as to its applicability). 138 This was where English, 
Australian, and New Zealand courts extended the law of defamation. None of these 
courts saw fit to change the onus of proof, yet did make the law less strict in relation wide 
publication. 
A constitution would have to be extremely explicit for a relaxation in defamation 
laws to be guaranteed. However, drafting such a provision would be an extremely 
difficult task. Generally worded provisions, of the nature usually included in 
constitutions, are subject to judicial interpretation. For example, the First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution states, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press". There is no savings provision like the one included 
in the Canadian Charter. Yet even with such an explicit provision, it has not been 
interpreted as literally prohibiting all laws that do not allow absolute freedom of speech. 
For instance, although defamation laws are greatly relaxed, they do still exist, which 
shows there is not an absolute right to free speech. 
135 Coates v The Citizen, above, para 59 Richard J. 
136 However, this has since been recognised in Canada, see Derrickson v Tom at ( 1992) 88 DLR ( 4 th) 40 I , 
408 Wood JA . 
137 
Richard G Dearden "Constitutional Protection for Defamatory Words Published About the Conduct of 
Public Officials" in David Schneidennan ( ed) Freedom of Expression and the Charter (Thomas 
Professional Publishing, Ontario, 1991) 287, 296 . 
138 Coates v The Citizen, above, para 65 Richard J. 
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Specific provisions referring to defamation would be out of place in a constitution 
that protects fundamental rights and freedoms. Such provisions would fit more easily 
with legislation. However, legislation on defamation is within the jurisdiction of 
provincial governments. 139 Therefore, it is not the duty of the federal government to pass 
a law on defamation that affects the whole of Canada. In any event, given the litigious 
nature of politicians, the government is often unwilling to change the laws of defamation. 
This is illustrated by the fact that changes to defamation laws in other jurisdictions have 
come about through the courts, rather than Parliament. In New Zealand, Parliament 
refused to adopt the proposal of the McKay Committee on Defamation (1977) to give 
greater protection to the media when reporting on matters in the public interest. 140 
However, the effect of the Courts' decision in Lange v Atkinson essentially gave this 
extra protection. 
C Is a Freedom of Expression Provision Irrelevant to Defamation Laws? 
This section has shown that it is very difficult to guarantee a relaxation in 
defamation laws though a constitution. However, it does not follow from this conclusion 
that a freedom of expression provision irrelevant to defamation laws. A freedom of 
expression provision is open to the courts to use, even if they choose not to. When a 
court is considering defamation laws, it has an extra provision to examine than courts in 
countries with no constitution. It gives citizens an extra means available for challenging 
the law. 
For instance, if a provincial government passed a law stating the truth was no 
longer a defence to a defamation action, the court would have the power to examine this 
in light of the constitution and strike it down if it was thought to be unconstitutional. In 
jurisdictions without a constitution, courts would be powerless to take action against this 
legislation. They are subject to the will of Parliament, and may only develop the 
139 Raymond E Brown The Law of Defamation in Canada (Carswell, Toronto, 1987) 9. 
140 Recommendations on th e Law of Defamation Report of the Committee on Defamation (December 1997) 
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common law. Therefore, although a freedom of expression provision cannot guarantee a 
relaxation in defamation laws, it is not a hollow provision. 
VI A CHANGE FOR CANADA? 
A Wrong Fact Situation? 
The decision in Hill appears to show that Canada is out of step with other 
commonwealth countries by refusing to change defamation laws. However, in every 
other jurisdiction examined, the plaintiff was ( or had been) an elected official. In Hill 
however, the plaintiff was merely an attorney for the Crown. 141 Would the Court in Hill 
have extended the common law of defamation if the plaintiff had held an elected 
position? 142 There are arguments both for and against this proposition. 
B Arguments Against This Proposition 
I Reasoning in Hill 
Courts commonly consider fact situations that are not directly before them. The 
entire case of Lange v ABC is devoted to a discussion of the importance of political 
discussion. Such discussion as allows voters to have full information about candidates 
running for office. 143 The system of government was said to require a free flow of 
information to enhance this. This was discussed in depth by the Court, even though the 
plaintiff was a former Prime Minister of New Zealand, where discussion about such a 
person would not usually be necessary for enhancing the system of representative 
government in Australia. 
Although it was not strictly necessary for the Canadian Court to consider 
situations where the plaintiff was an elected official, such a discussion could easily have 
141 Hill v Church of Scientology [1995] 2 SCR 1130. 
142 Hill v Church of Scientology, above. 
143 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1996) 145 ALR 96 (HC). 
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been included as obiter. The Supreme Court rarely hesitates to express its opinion on 
matters that are outside those in issue. 144 Therefore, the fact that there was no mention of 
the possibility of a change to the law in a different fact situation suggests that the Court 
would be unwilling to do so. 
Hill was decided unanimously by seven justices of the Supreme Court, including 
Justice McLauchlin, who is now the Chief Justice. 145 The judgment extends over 87 
pages, and thoroughly considers the interaction of the common law of defamation and the 
Charter. The Court then arrives at the conclusion that "the common law of defamation 
complies with the underlying values of the Charter and there is no need to amend or alter 
it". 146 After this detailed examination of the law, the Court would be unlikely to 
undertake another challenge to the law of defamation merely because the plaintiffs 
position changed from an unelected public official, to an elected public official. 
The Court cited the 1960s case of Boland v Globe & Mail Ltd with approval. 147 
This case did involve a candidate for a federal election. In this case it was held that the 
defence of qualified privilege was not open to a newspaper. The Court considered it 
would be "harmful to the common convenience and welfare of society" if such a wide 
publication of defamatory matter was allowed. 148 
Boland was decided four years before Sullivan, and thirty-seven years before the 
first Lange v Atkinson decision, at a time when there was less importance placed on 
freedom of expression generally, and there was no Charter. 149 So it is not surprising that 
Boland was decided the way it was. 150 However, it is surprising if the Court in a modem 
context was affirming this principle. 
144 Dennis W Boivin "Accommodating Freedom of Expression and Reputation in the Common Law of 
Defamation" ( 1997) 22 Queen 's LJ 229, 244. 
145 Hill v Church of Scientology [ 1995] 2 SCR 1130. 
146 Hill v Church of Scientology, above, para 144 Cory J for the Court . 
147 Boland v Globe & Mail Ltd [1960] SCR 203 . 
148 Boland v Globe Mail ltd, above, 208-209 Cartwright J for the Court, 
149 Boland v Globe Mail Ltd, above; New York Times v Sullivan (1964) 376 US 254; Lange v Atkinson 
[1997] 2 NZLR 22. 
30 
2 The value placed on reputation in Canada 
Canada may not change its defamation laws given a different fact situation if it 
places a higher value on reputation than in other jurisdictions. This section will compare 
the value Canada places on reputation with that of England and New Zealand. 
(a) Comparison with England and New Zealand 
The importance of reputation is discussed in depth in Hill. Cory J stated, "to most 
people, a good reputation is cherished above all. A good reputation is closely related to 
the innate worthiness and dignity of the individual". 151 In Reynolds, Lord Nicholls gave 
similar consideration to reputation. He pronounced "reputation is an integral and 
important part of the dignity of the individual". 152 The High Court in Lange v Atkinson 
considered that both free speech and reputation are important values based on 
fundamental human rights. 153 
Although the latter two cases show that reputation is important in New Zealand 
and England, there is some indication that reputation is valued more highly in Canada. 
This is due to the fact that reputation was given constitutional status. 154 Cory J 
acknowledged that reputation is not included in the Charter, but stated that the concept of 
individual dignity underlies all Charter rights. 155 Good reputation was said to reflect 
individual dignity, and was therefore of fundamental importance. He also stated that 
reputation is closely related to the right to privacy, which is protected by the 
constitution. 156 These factors lead Cory J to the conclusion that reputation deserves 
protection and must be weighed against the equally important right to freedom of 
150 Boland v Globe & Mail Ltd, above. 
151 Hill v Church of Scientology [I 995] 2 SCR I 130, para 110. 
152 Reynolds v Times Newspapers [ 1999] 4 All ER 609, 622. 
153 Lange v Atkinson [1997] 2 NZLR 22, 30 (HC) Elias J. 
154 Jeremy Streeter "The 'Deception Exception : A New Approach to Section 2 (b) Values and its impact 
on Defamation Law" (2003) 61 U Toronto Fae Law Rev 79, 87. 
155 Hill v Church of Scientology, above, para 123. 
156 Hill v Church of Scientology, above, para 124. 
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expression. 157 This statement shows the importance of reputation in Canada. Freedom of 
expression is a constitutionally protected right, yet reputation, which has no express 
protection, is considered just as important. 
Although New Zealand and England consider reputation to be important, it has 
not been stated by either of the highest courts to be of equal weight to freedom of 
expression. 
(b) Criminal libel 
Canada's criminal libel laws also show that reputation is valued more highly than 
in both England and New Zealand. Penal provisions for defamatory matter shows an 
extremely high value placed on reputation. New Zealand abolished the offence of 
criminal libel in 1992 when enacting the Defamation Act. 158 This shows a greater 
commitment to freedom of expression, and shows that bringing a person's reputation into 
disrepute is not worthy of criminal prosecution. 
In England, defamatory statements may be a criminal offence under the Libel Act 
1843, and also under common law. 159 Prosecution, however, is extremely rare. 160 The 
Law Commission has recommended abolishing criminal libel. However, this report has 
not been adopted. 161 
The Law Reform Commission of Canada has also recommended the removal of 
libel from the criminal code, which like England, has not been adopted. 162 However, 
unlike England, criminal libel laws received resounding endorsement by the Supreme 
Court. This occurred in the case of R v Lucas which challenged the constitutionality of 
157 Hill v Church of Scientology, above, para 124 
158 Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424,464 (CA) Blanchard J. 159 Halsbury's Laws of England (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003) Libel and Slander 5. 160 Practical Access to Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe "Criminal Defamation Laws and the 
Right to Freedom of Expression" <http: //www.bghelsinki.org/fe/suggestions_en .html> (last accessed 1 
September 2003) 
161 The United Kingdom Parliament <http: //www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm I 99899/cmhansrd/vo990126/text/90126w I O.htm> (last accessed 26 August 2003). 
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certain provisions of the criminal code. 163 These provisions imposed criminal sanctions 
for deliberate publication of defamatory statements that the publisher knows to be 
false. 164 In this case Mr. and Mrs. Lucas picketed outside the Saskatchewan Provincial 
Court and a police headquarters with signs falsely accusing a police officer being a party 
to the rape an eight year old. 
The Court found that the statute contravened section 2 (b) of the Charter, because 
the purpose of the sections were to prohibit expression. 165 However, it was held to be a 
justifiable limit under section one. 166 The case of R v Oakes set out the criteria to 
consider when evaluating if the infringement of a Charter right or freedom can be 
justified under section 1. 167 One of the questions that must be asked is whether the 
objective of the legislation is pressing and important enough to override a Charter 
right. 168 The Court considered that the aim of the Act was to protect reputation. 169 Cory 
J believed that this was a pressing and substantial objective in Canadian society. 170 In 
words very similar to those used in Hill the Court referred to the fact that protection of 
reputation recognises the innate dignity of the individual, and that there is a link between 
reputation and participation in society. 171 The Court also stated that reputation is an 
attribute that is "highly sought after, prized and cherished by most individuals. The 
enjoyment of a good reputation in the community is to be valued beyond riches". 172 This 
statement and the penalty imposed on the Lucas's shows the extremely high value given 
to reputation. (Mr. Lucas was sentenced to 2 years jail, and Mrs. Lucas to 22 months.) 
Another requirement from Oakes is that the legislation must limit freedom of 
expression as little as possible. 173 This was held to be the case, as the Crown must prove 
162 Raymond E Brown The Law of Defamation in Canada (Carswell, Toronto, 1987) 9. 163 R v Lucas [1998] I SCR 439. 
164 R v Lucas, above, para I Cory J (Lamer CJC, Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache JJ concuning). 165 R v Lucas, above, para 28, Cory J (Lamer CJC, Gonthier, Iacobucci , Bastarache JJ concuning). 166 R v Lucas, above, para I 09, Cory J(Lamer CJC, Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache JJ concurring). 167 R v Oakes [ 1986] I SCR I 03. 
168 R v Oakes, above, para 73 Dickson CJC (Chouinard, Lamer, Wilson and Le Dain JJ. concurring). 169 R v Lucas, above, para 46 Cory J (Lamer CJC, Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache JJ concuITing). 110 R v Lucas, above, para 48 Cory J (Lamer CJC, Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache JJ concurring). 171 R v Lucas, above, para 48 Cory J (Lamer CJC, Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache JJ concuITing). 172 R v Lucas, above, para 46 Cory J (Lamer CJC, Gonthier, Iacobucci , Bastarache JJ concurring). 173 R v Oakes, above, para 74 Dickson CJC (Chouinard, Lamer, Wilson and Le Dain JJ. conctllTing). 
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the matter is defamatory, and that the accused knew the defamation was false, and had 
intent to defame. Cory J stated that requirement was easy to fulfil , given the negligible 
value of defamatory expression. 174 
( c) The reputations of elected officials 
The free flow of ideas has long been held to be important to the functioning of 
democracy. This was illustrated by Brennan J in Sullivan when he stated that debate on 
public issues should be "uninhibited, robust, and wide open". 175 The courts in New 
Zealand and England have also upheld this principle, which were the primary reasons for 
the relaxation of defamation laws in these jurisdictions. 
This idea has also been recognised in Canada. The case of Edmonton Journal v 
Alberta (Attorney General) involved a section 2 (b) challenge to the Alberta Judicial Act 
regarding restrictions on publication of some matrimonial proceedings and pre-trial 
stages of civil actions. 176 The Court held these provisions to be unconstitutional. Cory J 
stated, "It is difficult to imagine a guaranteed right more important to a democracy than 
freedom of expression. Indeed, democracy cannot exist without that freedom to express 
new ideas and to put forward opinions about the functioning of public institutions". 177 
Cory J made similar statements in R v Kopyto, a case concerning contempt of 
court. At page 462 he stated "the very life-blood of democracy is the free exchange of 
ideas and opinions. If these exchanges are stifled, democratic government itself is 
threatened". 178 
However, recognition of this idea does not necessarily mean that defamation laws 
will change. Canadian courts appear to value the reputation of public officials more 
174 R v Lucas, above, para 57 Dickson CJC (Chouinard, Lamer, Wilson and Le Dain JJ. concurring). 175 New York Times v Sullivan (1964) 376 US 254, 270. 176 Edmonton Journal v Alberta (Attorn ey General) [1989] 2 SCR 1326. 177 Edmonton Journal v Alberta (Attorn ey General), above, 1336 Cory J (Dickson CJC and Lamer J concurring). 
178 R v Kopyto (1987) 62 OR (2d) 449, 462 (Ont SC) Cory JA .. 
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highly than courts in other jurisdictions. It is clear that Canada values reputation more 
highly than the United States. This was illustrated by Richard Jin Coates when he stated, 
"Our judges cherish free speech and free press no less than their American counterparts. 
They just happen to value personal reputation, particularly of their public servants 
more." 179 It was also shown by the Supreme Court's refusal to employ the Sullivan 
actual malice rule. 
The courts in both New Zealand and England also refused to adopt the actual 
malice rule. They believed that politicians still have the right to protection of reputation, 
which is drastically reduced by the Sullivan rule. However, the relaxation of defamation 
laws that took place means that this protection has been sacrificed to a certain extent. 
There is evidence that Canada will not be willing to make this sacrifice, which shows the 
importance placed on the reputation of every individual, including those holding elected 
positions. 
The classical formulation regarding the reputation of public officials was stated in 
Boland. 180 The judge held that more relaxed defamation laws for politicians would "tend 
to deter sensitive and honourable men from seeking public positions of trust and 
responsibility and leave them open to others who have no respect for reputation". 181 
In the case of Goddard v Day the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench directly 
considered the question of whether the common law of defamation regarding political 
discussion is inconsistent with the values of freedom of expression in section 2 (b) of the 
Charter. 182 The court held that it was not, and stated that "in balancing the interests of 
freedom of expression and protection of reputation the latter gains paramountcy when 
what is freely expressed is false, whether or not the speaker is aware of the fact". 183 It is 
interesting that the right to reputation could ever be considered paramount to the 
constitutionally protected right of freedom of expression. 
179 Coates v The Citizen (1988) 44 CCLT 286, para 62 ( SSC). 
180 Boland v Globe & Mail Ltd [1960] SCR 203. 
18 1 Boland v Globe & Mail Ltd, above, 208, Cartwright J (for the Court). 
182 Goddard v Day (2000) 194 DLR (4 th) 559 (Alta Ct QB) 
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Before Hill was decided, the British Columbia Court of Appeal considered the 
issue of the law of defamation in relation to an elected official in Derrickson v Tomat. 184 
Wood JA believed that an introduction of the Sullivan rule "would be likely to discourage 
honest and decent people from standing for public office". 185 He considered the cases of 
Snyder v Montreal Gazette Ltd1 86 and MacKay v Southam Co 187 that had been seen as 
authority for the proposition that higher damages should be awarded to those in public 
life, as compared to other cases. This was because society should show the esteem those 
involved in public affairs are held in to ensure the involvement of the best citizens. 
However, Woods JA held that this proposition could not stand in light of the Charter. 188 
The judge found that the common law rules of defamation should remain, but when the 
plaintiff is an elected official non-pecuniary damages should be limited to an amount to 
bring to the public attention the fact that the defamatory statements were untrue. 189 This 
was due to a number of factors. Firstly, he referred to the importance of open discussion 
in a democracy. Secondly, that modem political debate is often exaggerated and 
inaccurate, and therefore citizens take this into account when assessing statements made 
about elected officials. Finally, those defamed have access to channels in which they can 
reply to the statement. 190 
This approach was followed in both Tornberg v Worrell 191 and Neapotung v 
Whitehead1 92 . It was considered in Newson v Kexco Publishing Co 193 where the plaintiff 
was not an elected official, but a senior bureaucrat. The Court was unwilling to make a 
conclusive decision on this, as the trial judge found that there was actual malice on behalf 
of the defendant. It was held that there should be no cap on damages when malice is 
183 Goddard v Day, above, para 54 Ritter J. 
184 
Hill v Church of Scientology [1995] 2 SCR 1130; Derrickson v Tomat (1992) 88 DLR (4th ) 401 
(BCCA) 
185 Derrickson v Toma/, above, 408 Wood JA . 
186 Snyder v Montreal Gazette Ltd (1978) 87 DLR (3d) 5 (Que SC). 
187 MacKay v Southam Co ( 1955) 1 DLR (2d) I (BCCA). 
188 Derrickson v Toma/, above, 409 Wood JA. 
189 Derrickson v Tomat, above, 411 Wood JA. 
190 
Derrickson v Tomat, above, 405 Wood JA. 
191 Tornberg v Worrell [ 1995] AJ No 1312 (Alta Ct QB) . 
192 Neapotung v Whitehead [ 1994] I WWR 206 (Sask Ct QB). 
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found, as there is no public interest in malicious statements. However, Lambert JA 
expressed the opinion that reduced damages for public servants would not have the same 
justifications as for public officials. This was because public servants do not have the 
same opportunity to reply to criticisms, nor have they entered the public arena to the 
same extent as elected officials. 194 
The Supreme Court did not mention these decisions in Hill. 195 It was not strictly 
necessary to decide on the issue of damages for an elected official, as the plaintiff was 
merely an employee of the Crown. However, the issue could have been addressed as 
obiter dicta. The Court found that there should be no cap on general damages, and 
upheld an award of $1.6 million overall. This suggests that the Supreme Court may not 
follow the Derrickson v Tomat line of reasoning. Also, Derrickson v Toma! was referred 
to in another part of the judgment, which shows that the Court was aware of the case but 
chose not to express an opinion on this aspect of it. 196 
(d) Summary 
Reputation is valued somewhat higher in Canada than in New Zealand and 
England. This has been shown by the constitutional value given to reputation, and the 
endorsement of criminal libel provisions by the Supreme Court. Dicta in Canadian cases 
also show the importance of the reputations of elected officials. However, this is 
tempered by the possibility of reduced damages, which shows recognition of the idea that 
freedom to discuss political ideas is essential to democracy. Therefore, while Canada 
appears to value reputation more highly than England and New Zealand, the overall 
difference is slight. 
193 Newson v Kexco Publishing Co ( 1995) BCLR (3d) 176 (BCCA). 194 Newson v Kexco Publishing Co, above, para 38 Lambert JA. 
195 Hill v Church of Scientology [ 1995] 2 SCR 1130. 196 
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C Arguments For This Proposition 
I Statements made in Hill 
The Court stated that the common law complied with Charter values 'in its 
application to the parties in this action'. Academic Denis Boivin suggests four factors 
that Cory J had in mind by this statement: 197 
(i) The fact that it was a private action meant the Charter did not directly apply. 
(ii) The defendant was not part of the media. 
(iii) The speech at issue was not of a political nature. 
(iv) The defendant did not take reasonable steps to investigate the truth of the 
statement. 
By limiting the judgment to the facts at hand, Cory J left the door open for 
modification of defamation laws at a later date. This could possibly happen when the 
plaintiff is in an elected position and the defamatory statement relates to the performance 
of his or her duties. 
Many provincial courts have extended defamation laws beyond what was decided 
in Hill. However, there has been disagreement as to whether the laws can be modified, in 
light of Hill and if so to what extent. 
2 Provincial court decisions 
The Supreme Court in Hill devoted its attention to whether the Sullivan standard 
of actual malice should be adopted in Canada. 198 Like the rest of the Commonwealth, 
this standard was rejected. However, unlike other common law countries, the Supreme 
Court did not consider the other options available for extending the common law. Some 
197 Dennis W Boivin "Accommodating Freedom of Expression and Reputation in the Common Law of 
Defamation" (1997) 22 Queen 's LJ 229, 240. 
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consideration was given to the defence of qualified privilege, and a small inroad into its 
application was made. Pre-Hill, publication of a fair and accurate report of judicial 
proceedings was held to be an occasion of qualified privilege. 199 This included pleadings 
and court documents filed before trial. In Hill, the defendants made the report on the 
contempt charge before the documents were filed. The Supreme Court held that the 
occasion was still privileged, and should not be defeated by this technicality. 200 
However, the privilege was defeated for another reason, namely the legitimate 
purposes of the occasion were exceeded.201 This was because the defendant Manning 
took no steps to verify the accuracy of the allegations made against Hill. The Court 
found that this was unreasonable, particularly as Manning was an experienced lawyer. 
Holding a press conference was an extremely wide publication of allegations that had not 
yet been tested by law. Manning's conduct was thought to be 'high handed and 
careless'. 202 
The Court did not consider the general question of whether wide publications 
were capable of attracting qualified privilege. However, the fact that a press conference 
was held did not appear to automatically defeat the privilege. The Court considered the 
surrounding circumstances, and concluded that on the facts privilege was exceeded. 
Therefore, it is possible that in a different fact situation the Court would extend the 
availability of qualified privilege to include wide publication. This would bring Canada 
into line with its commonwealth counterparts. 
The provincial courts of Ontario and British Columbia have already shown a 
willingness to allow the use of qualified privilege when there has been a wide publication 
of untrue and defamatory statements. This has been done by taking a more expansive 
approach to the common law duty/interest test, rather than by use of the Charter. 
198 Hill v Church of Scientology [ 1995] 2 SCR 1130, paras 125-145 Cory J for the Court; New York Times v 
Sullivan (1964) 376 US 254. 
199 Partrick Mi Imo QC and Professor WVH Rogers (eds) Gatley on Libel and Slander (9ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell , London, 1998) 325. 
200 Hill v Church of Scientology, above, para 157 Cory J for the Court. 
20 1 Hill v Church of Scientology, above, para 158 Cory J for the Court. 
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The traditional view has been that qualified privilege cannot be used when there 
has been a statement made 'to the world' which generally refers to any statement made 
by or through the media. The Supreme Court in Jones v Bennett enunciated this 
principle.203 In that case, the Premier made defamatory statements about the chairman of 
a provincial commission, which were reported by the press. The Court of Appeal held 
that the occasion was privileged, but the Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the 
privilege cannot be used when a statement is published generally. 204 
Ten years later, in the 1979 case of Stopforth v Goyer the Ontario Court of Appeal 
allowed the defence of qualified privilege to be used when a statement was made by a 
minister to the media. 205 The Court held that the electorate had an interest in knowing 
why a senior civil servant was dismissed, and that the minister had a duty to give reasons 
for the dismissal. 206 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal allowed the defence to apply to a wide 
publication in the case of Parlett v Robinson.207 In that case a Member of Parliament 
criticised a senior official involved with corrections at a news conference. The defendant 
believed the plaintiff was exploiting prisoners work for his own profit. The defendant 
failed to persuade the Minister to order a public inquiry. The Court held that the 
defendant had a duty to make these statements to persuade the Minister to order an 
investigation.208 The statements were not considered to be too wide, as the electorate had 
an interest in knowing whether the corrections service was being properly 
administered.209 The Court distinguished the case from Jones by stating that in Jones the 
defendant had no duty to publish the statement.210 
202 Hill v Church of Scientology, above, para 159 Cory J for the Court. 203 Jones v Bennett [ 1969] SCR 277. 
204 Jones v Bennett, above, para 26 Cartwright CJ for the Court. 
205 Stopforth v Goyer (1979) 97 DLR (3d) 369 (Ont CA) Jessup JA for the Court. 206 Stopforth v Goyer, above, para 4 Jessup JA for the Court. 
201 Parlett v Robinson ( 1986) 30 DLR (4ct') 247 (BCCA) 
208 Parlett v Robinson, above, 256 Nemetz CJBC, Hinkson and Hutcheon JJA . 209 Parlett v Robinson , above, 256 Nemetz CJBC, Hinkson and Hutcheon JJA . 
40 
The extent of qualified privilege was considered in Moises v Canadian 
Newspapers. 211 The Court stated that the categories in which qualified privilege will 
apply are not closed. 212 It was noted that other decisions of the Court showed the 
principle in Jones was not absolute.213 The Court then quoted a passage from Sapiro v 
Leader Publishing Co which set out factors to be considered in determining whether the 
occasion is privileged or not.214 This includes the nature of the duty and interest, the 
urgency of the occasion, and whether what was published was relevant and reasonably 
appropriate to the occasion. 
A ,f • h Id b f 1 · fi d . · 1 215 1v1ozses was e not to e an occasion o qua 1 1e pnv1 ege. The case 
involved a defendant newspaper, which had published an article referring to the plaintiff 
as an officer in a terrorist group. The Court found that even if the public did have a 
legitimate interest in receiving the information, the newspaper had no duty to publish the 
article, as the plaintiff was not a threat to anyone in Canada. 216 
Ontario courts have expressly extended the defence of qualified privilege to apply 
to widely published statements. The authority for this proposition is Grenier v Southam 
Inc. 21 7 The defendant newspaper had published an article about a religious cult that 
appeared to be holding some adherents in obsessive capacity. The trial judge held that 
there was a social and moral duty to publish the article, and it was therefore published on 
an occasion of privilege. The appeal court upheld this finding. 218 
This was followed in Silva v Toronto Star Newspapers, where two journalists 
wrote a series of articles about subsidised public housing. 219 The plaintiff was a building 
210 Parlett v Robinson , above, 257 Nemetz CJBC, Hinkson and Hutcheon JJA. 21 1 Moises v Canadian Newspapers Co (1996) 30 CCL T (2d) 145 (BCCA). 212 Moises v Canadian Newspapers Co, above, para 18 Williams JA for the Court. 213 Moises v Canadian Newspapers Co, above, para 24 Williams JA for the Court. 214 Moises v Canadian Newspapers Co, above, para 19 Williams JA for the Court; Sapiro v Leader 
Publishing Co [1926] 2 WWR 268,271, 20 Sask LR 449 (CA) Lamont JA. 215 Moises v Canadian Newspapers Co, above, para 32 Williams JA for the Court. 2 16 Moises v Canadian Newspapers Co, above, para 32 Williams JA for the Court. 217 Grenier v Southam Inc OJ No 2193 (Ont CA). 
218 Grenier v Southam Inc, above, para 4 Judgment of the Court. 
219 Silva v Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd (1998) 167 DLR (4 th) 554 (Ont CJ) 
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manager, who complained that an article was defamatory, as it referred to her hassling 
tenants, and providing favourable treatment to those who gave her expensive presents.220 
The article was held to have a social and moral purpose. 221 It is interesting to note that 
there is no mention of a reciprocal interest on the side of the public. The judgment 
focuses on the importance of giving those living in sub-standard accommodation a 
chance to speak, rather than considering whether the public had an interest in receiving 
the information. 
However, the Ontario Court of Justice expressly refused to expand the defence of 
qualified privilege in the case of Hodgson v Canadian Newspapers Co.222 In that case, a 
reporter from The Globe and Mail published articles about the regional commissioner of 
engineering alleging misuse of public office. The Court held that the Supreme Court's 
decision in Boland v Globe & Mail Ltd remain the law in Canada, and therefore a 
newspaper cannot raise the defence of qualified privilege at common law.223 Lane J 
referred to the fact that in Hill the Court rejected the adoption of the 'actual malice' rule, 
and stated that an expansion of qualified privilege allowing newspapers to report on 
public officials and public matters would come too close to an adoption of this rule.224 
Two years later, the case of Myers v Canadian Broadcasting Corp mentioned the 
ruling in Hodgson, yet cited Grenier and Silva as evidence that the availability of 
qualified privilege may be expanding. 225 The Court held that the overall approach of the 
House of Lords in Reynolds was consistent with the Canadian approach to qualified 
privilege, and that the factors mentioned in Reynolds were helpful in examining whether 
circumstances surrounding the publication made the occasion privileged.226 However, 
Bellamy J held that the urgency of publication was necessary for the availability of 
qualified privilege. In both Grenier and Silva there was an urgent need to make the 
220 Silva v Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd, above, para 18 Somers J. 
22 1 Silva v Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd, above, para 49 Somers J. 
222 Hodgson v Canadian Newspapers Co ( 1998) 39 OR (3d) 235 (Ont CJ) . 
223 Hodgson v Canadian Newspapers Co, above, para 457 Lane J; Boland v Globe & Mail Ltd [ I 960] SCR 
203. 
224 Hodgson v Canadian Newspapers Co, above, para 458 Lane J. 
225 Myers v Canadian Broadcasting Corp [ 1999] OJ No 4380, paras 71 - 72 (Ont SCJ) Bellamy J. 
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reports. 227 This factor was absent in Myers. A television news show ran a programme 
that gave a negative portrayal of a cardiologist for his views on the safety of a particular 
drug. Before the programme was aired four months were spent researching this topic, 
which shows that there was no urgency and the facts should have been checked more 
thoroughly. Therefore, there was no duty to broadcast the news item, and the occasion 
. ·1 d 228 was not pnv1 ege . 
In Leenen v Canadian Broadcasting Corp, another cardiologist brought an action 
in defamation for the same programme as in Myers. 229 Leenen alleged the programme 
showed his support of a controversial type of drug was due to his relationship with a 
pharmaceutical company. The judge in this case accepted without question that the 
defence of qualified privilege was available to wide publications. At paragraph 114 he 
stated, "Until recently, there was some doubt as to whether publications to the world at 
large could ever give rise to an occasion of qualified privilege. However, that issue was 
definitively resolved by the Court of Appeal in Grenier." He went on to quote the factors 
listed by Lord Nicholls in Reynolds to determine whether there is a duty to convey the 
information, and whether there is a corresponding interest in receiving that 
information.230 By listing these factors , the judge in essence accepts that Reynolds is 
good law in Canada. 23 1 
In Ward v Clark, the Court held that the defendant was entitled to use the defence 
of qualified privilege in respect of comments he made to a reporter for the Vancouver 
Sun, a paper widely circulated in the province.232 The judge found that a reciprocal duty 
and interest had been established. The plaintiff, a marine engineer and consultant in the 
business of ship brokering, had made criticisms to the press of a fast-ferry project over 
which the defendant had control. The public was held to have an interest in hearing a 
226 Myers v Canadian Broadcasting Corp, above, para 75; Reynolds v Tim e Newspapers [l 999] 4 All ER 
609 (HL). 
227 Myers v Canadian Broadcasting Corp, above, para 79 Bellamy J. 
228 Myers v Canadian Broadcasting Corp , above, para 81 Bellamy J. 
229 Leenen v Canadian Broadcasting Corp 50 CCLT (2d) 213 (Ont SCJ). 
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response to the concerns raised. Therefore, the defendant had a duty as the responsible 
minister to reply to these criticisms to the same audience. 233 
In Lee v Globe & Mail the former President of Singapore allegedly made 
defamatory remarks about the former Prime Minister of Singapore, in an interview 
bl . h d · 234 pu IS e m a newspaper. This was an application to strike out the defence of 
qualified privilege. The Court refused to strike out this defence, as "it is an area where 
the law has been evolving and where the determination of the application of qualified 
. · 1 . £ d . ,, 23 5 pnvI ege IS act- nven . The Court mentioned that although urgency has been 
considered to be important in other cases, it is only one of the factors mentioned in 
Reynolds, and failure to meet one of the factors does not necessarily mean the defence 
will fail. 236 
This issue was considered in Dhami v Canadian Broadcasting Corp .237 The 
plaintiffs were members of the executive of a Sikh Temple. They alleged the statements 
made by the defendant broadcasters implied that the plaintiffs had misappropriated funds 
from the Temple. This was an application by the plaintiffs to strike out various defences 
raised by the defence. The Court refused to strike out the defence of qualified privilege, 
even though there was wide publication of the material. The Court considered Reynolds, 
and held that it could apply in British Columbia to the extent that it does not conflict with 
the Court of Appeal reasons in Moises. 238 The Court disagreed with the plaintiffs 
contention that Reynolds only applies in government and political matters. 239 
The recent case of Young v Toronto Newspapers Ltd reinforced this extension.240 
The Chief Coroner for Ontario brought an action alleging defamatory statements were 
made about him in an article in the Toronto Star. Rouleau J followed the decision in 
233 Ward v Clark, above, para 49 Owen-Flood J. 
234 l ee v Globe & Mail (200 I) 52 OR (3d) 652 (Ont SCJ) . 
235 l ee v Globe & Mail , above, para 21 Swinton J. 
236 l ee v Globe & Mail, above, para 21 Swinton J. 
237 Dhami v Canadian Broadcasting Corp (200 I) BCSC 1811 . 
238 Dhami v Canadian Broadcasting Co,p, above, para 88 Slade J. 
239 Dhami v Canadian Broadcasting Corp, above, para 89 Slade J. 
240 Young v Toronto Newspapers Ltd (2003) WL 21787002 (Ont SCJ). 
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Grenier v Southam Inc, and asserted that qualified privilege is available to newspapers 
where there was a social or moral duty to publish.24 1 The judge considered each of the 
factors set out in Reynolds as they applied to this case to determine whether qualified 
privilege was available. 242 He found qualified privilege did not apply in this case, as 
reasonable steps had not been taken to verify the information.243 
However, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court has not followed this approach, as 
shown by the recent case of Campbell v Jones. 244 In the course of an investigation of a 
theft at a school, a police officer subjected three twelve year-old African-Canadian girls 
to a search involving the removal of some of their clothing. Lawyers were retained to 
make a complaint under the Police Act. The lawyers held a press conference, where it 
was stated that Campbell had 'strip-searched' the girls (when in fact her actions fell short 
of this), and that she was motivated by racial factors. 
The Court examined the defence of qualified privilege, and considered the 
approach taken in Reynolds and by the courts in other Canadian provinces. It held that 
qualified privilege did not apply in this case.245 Moir J was reluctant to extend the 
defence of qualified privilege, as he felt constrained by authority. He cited the case of 
Jones v Bennett, and refened to the importance of reputation as stated in Hill, as reasons 
against allowing the defence to apply to a publication made to the world at large.246 
He did acknowledge, however, that while publication to the world at large is a 
factor strongly indicating against qualified privilege, it does not necessarily defeat the 
application of the defence. It may still be available where the "duty is so strong, interest 
so compelling and circumstances so justified that the public should be told even if the 
information may tum out to be defamatory and untrue."247 Nonetheless, he stated that 
24 1 Young v Toronto Newspapers Ltd, above, para 175 Rouleau J. 
242 Young v Toronto Newspapers Ltd, above, para 186 Rouleau J. 
243 Young v Toronto Newspapers Ltd, above, para 188 Rouleau J. 
244 Campbell vJones (2001) NSSC 139. 
245 Campbell v Jones, above, para 51 Moir J. 
246 Campbell vJones, above, para 43 Moir J. 
247 Campbell vJones, above, para 44 Moir J. 
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this is a high standard, and that the grounds would have to be different to those in Jones v 
Bennet.248 
It is interesting to note that the Court mentioned that Reynolds and Sullivan 
concerned press publications about politicians, while both Hill and Campbell concerned 
publications to the press about officials who were not politicians.249 Although this 
distinction was mentioned, it was not pursued as a reason for disallowing qualified 
privilege in this case. 
D Summary 
Although the reasomng m Hill suggests that Canada has taken a different 
approach to the balancing of freedom of expression and protection of reputation than 
other jurisdictions, decisions of provincial courts suggest that Canada is not such an 
oddity. 250 The approach taken by some of the provincial courts has shown that there is 
willingness in Canada to expand the application of the defence of qualified privilege. 
These courts have gone further than Australia and New Zealand by finding that an 
occasion may be privileged for matters outside of political situations. If an issue came 
before the Supreme Court where a media defendant had a strong duty to publish, and the 
public had a corresponding interest, decisions of provincial courts show that the Supreme 
Court would be likely to find that qualified privilege existed. The Court now has the 
benefit of the decisions in Lange v Atkinson, Lange v ABC, and Reynolds v Times 
Newspapers Ltd, which would be likely to influence its decision.251 The experience of 
the provincial courts show that this would be likely to be done through a common 
expansion, rather than through a Charter challenge. 
248 Campbell v Jones, above, para 44 Moir J; Jones v Bennett [1969] SCR 277. 249 Campbell vJones, above, para 40 Moir J. 
250 Hill v Church of Scientology [ 1995] 2 SCR I 130. 
251 Lange v Atkinson [2000] I NZLR 385 (CA); Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1996) 145 
ALR 96 (HC); Reynolds v Times Newspapers [1999] 4 All ER 609 (HL). 
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VII CONCLUSION 
This essay has explained and illustrated that a freedom of expression provision in 
a constitution does not guarantee a relaxation in defamation laws. Although a relaxation 
of the law was the response of a constitutional challenge in the United States, it was not 
considered necessary by the Supreme Court of Canada. The experiences of England, 
Australia, and New Zealand have shown that the converse is also true, in that a 
constitutional guarantee is not necessary to relax defamation laws. 
As constitutions are subject to judicial interpretation, it is difficult to draft a 
provision that would guarantee a relaxation in defamation laws. In Hill it was held that 
the Charter did not apply directly to the common law of defamation.252 However, even if 
the Charter did apply directly, it would still have been open to the Court to find that the 
common law of defamation did not require modification. 
Although Hill appears to show that Canada has struck the freedom of expression / 
protection of reputation balance in a different way to other common law countries, this 
essay has shown the difference would not necessarily persist with a different fact 
situation.253 Provincial courts have extended the defence of qualified privilege in a 
similar manner to that of the United Kingdom, and beyond that of Australia and New 
Zealand. This means that qualified privilege may be available to the media when 
reporting on a wide range of issues, including political matters. 
Although the Charter is an available tool to reassess the law of defamation, the 
Supreme Court has so far declined to do so. In the future, it may choose to follow the 
route of provincial courts. Provincial courts have developed the law, but have done so on 
the basis of common law rather than constitutional principles. 
252 Hill v Church of Scientology [ 1995] 2 SCR 11 30, para 8 1. 
253 Hill v Church of Scientology, above. 
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